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L/BRARY  OF  CONGRESS 


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Joseph  K.  F.  Mansfield, 

BKir.ADIEU  GENERAL  OF  THE  U.  S.  ARMY. 


A  NARRATIVi:  OF  EVENTS  CONNECTED 
WITH   MIS  MORTAL  WOUNDING 


ANTIETAM, 

Sharpsburg,  Maryland, 


September    17,    18G2. 


JOHN  MEAD  GOULD, 

Late  Actinc;  Adjitant  IOtii  Maink  Volunteers, 
AND  Major  20th  Maink  Veteran  Vols. 


PORTLAND : 
STEPHEN  BEIIUY,   PRINTER. 

Ib'Ju. 


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K 

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Joseph  King  Fenno  Mansfield  was  born  in  New  Haven,  Conn., 
December  22,  1803.  His  early  education  was  obtained  in  the 
common  schools  of  his  state.  At  the  age  of  fourteen  he  entered 
the  military  academy  at  West  Point,  being  the  youngest  of  a 
class  of  forty.  During  the  five  years  of  his  course,  he  was  a 
careful  and  earnest  student,  especially  distinguishing  himself 
in  the  sciences,  and  graduating  in  1822,  second  in  his  class. 

He  was  immediately  promoted  to  the  Corps  of  Engineers,  in 
which  department  he  served  thoughout  the  Mexican  war.  In 
1832  he  was  made  1st  Lieutenant;  three  years  later  Captain. 

His  gallantry  and  efficiency  during  the  Mexican  war  were  re- 
warded by  successive  brevets  of  Major,  Lt.-Colonel  and  Colonel 
of  Engineers. 

In  1853  Mansfield  was  appointed  Inspector  General  of  the 
army,  and  in  the  prosecution  of  his  duties  visited  all  parts  of 
the  country. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  he  was  in  the 
Northwest,  but  in  April,  1861,  was  summoned  to  Washington  to 
take  command  of  the  forces  there.  On  May  17,  1861,  Mans- 
field was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  Brigadier  General  in  the  reg- 
ular army. 

He  rendered  valuable  service  at  Fortress  Monroe,  Newport 
News,  Suffolk,  and  finally  at  Antietam,  where  he  was  mortally 
wounded,  September  17,  1862. 

•     61505 
'05 


J 


NARRATIVE. 


It  was  bad  enough  and  sad  enough  that  Gen.  Mans- 
field should  be  mortally  wounded  once,  but  to  be 
wounded  six,  seven  or  eight  times  in  as  many  locali- 
ties is  too  much  of  a  story  to  let  stand  unchallenged. 

These  pages  will  tell  what  the  members  of  the  loth 
Maine  Regiment  know  of  the  event,  but  first  we  will 
state  what  others  have  claimed. 

The  following  places  have  been  pointed  out  as  the 
spot  where  Mansfield  was  wounded  and  all  sorts  of 
particulars  hav^e  been  given.  Besides  these  a  man 
with  a  magic-lantern  is  traveling  through  the  country 
showing  Burnside's  bridge,  and  remarking,  "  Here 
Mansfield  fell." 

The  spot  marked  A  on  the  map  is  said  to  have 
been  vouched  for  by  a  "  New  York  officer  of  Mans- 
field's staff." 

B  is  where  the  late  David  R.  Miller  understood  the 
General  was  wounded  by  a  sharpshooter  stationed  in 
Miller's  barn,  west  of  the  pike. 

C  is  where  Capt.  Gardiner  and  Lieut.  Dunegan,  of 
Co.  K,  1 25th  Penn.  Vols.,  assured  me*  that  the  General 
fell  from  his  horse  in  front  of  their  company. 

*Sept.  17,  1891. 


GE>f.    MANSFIELD    AT    ANTIETAM. 


D  is  where,  in  November,  1894,  I  found. a  marker, 
that  had  been  placed  there  the  October  previous,  by 
some  one  unknown  to  me.  These  are  the  four  prin- 
cipal placQS  which  have  been  pointed  out  to  visitors. 
Still  another  spot  was  shown  to  our  party  when  the 
i-io-29th  Maine  Regiment  Association  made  its  first 
visit  to  the  field,  Oct.  4,  18S9;  it  is  south  of  A,  but 
I  did  not  note  exactly  where. 

E.  There  has  also  been  published  in  the  National 
Tribune,  which  has  an  immense  circulation  among 
the  soldiers,  the  statement*  of  Col.  John  H.  Keatley, 
now  Commandant  of  the  Soldier's  Home,  Marshall- 
town,  Iowa,  who  locates  the  place  near  the  Dunker 
Church. 

Col.  Keatley\s  letters  show  that  he  has  been  on  the 
field  several  times  since  the  war,  which  makes  it  harder 
to  believe  what  would  seem  very  plain  otherwise,  that 
his  memory  of  locations  has  failed  him.  He  appears 
to  have  got  the  recollection  of  the  two  woods  mixed. 
Keatley  was  Sergeant  of  Co.  A,  the  extreme  left  of 
the  125th  Penn. 


*Tlie  brigade  [Crawford's]  had  reached  a  point  close  to  the  Ilagorstowu 
pike,  with  the  left  almost  touching  the  Dunker  Church.  The  brigade  was 
within  50  yards  of  the  turnpike,  ready  to  cross  over  and  into  the  woods 
lining  the  road  on  the  opposite  side.  These  woods  were  filled  with  Stone- 
wallJackson's  troops;  andtheinsharpshooters  in  the  foliage  were  picking  off 
officers.  *  *  Notwithstanding  the  hazard,  Gen.  Mansfield,  instead  of  send- 
ing a  staff  officer  to  direct  the  movement  of  the  troops  toward  the  point  in- 
tended by  him,  rode  forward  himself  and  gave  personal-  directions,  wholly 
in  a  matter  of  detail  (the  alignment  of  a  single  regiment  that  was  making  an 
effort  to  dress  on  its  colors),  and  when  engaged  in  that  unimportant  duty  of 
detail  for  a  corps  commander,  was  shot  from  the  woods  and  almost  instantly 
killed. 

[National  Tribune,  Washington,  D.  C,  Nov.  16,  1893. 


GEN.    MANSKIKLI)    AT    AXTIKTAM. 


Mr.  Alexander  Davis,  who  resided  and  worked  on 
the  field  before  and  after  the  battle,  points  out  a  place 
several  rods  northeast  of  the  present  residence  of 
Millard  F.  Nicodemus  (built  since  the  war  and  not 
shown  on  the  map).  Some  Indiana  troops  were  the 
supposed  original  authority  for  this  place,  which  is 
not  far  from  B.  It  is  only  fair  to  Mr.  Davis  to  add 
that  he  claims  no  personal  knowledge. 

There  are  several  other  places  that  have  been  de- 
scribed to  me  in  private  letters,  but  these  need  no 
mention  here. 


WHY  50  HANY  ERRORS? 

Why  has  there  been  so  much  difficulty  in  identify- 
ing the  right  locality? 

There  has  been  no  difficulty,  none  whatever,  among 
those  who  knew  the  facts.  The  errors  have  all  come 
from  the  ignorant,  the  imaginative,  and  those  who 
have  poor  memories. 

It  will  be  easy,  especially  for  one  standing  on  the 
ground  while  reading  these  pages,  to  see  that  very 
few  except  the  loth  Maine  would  witness  the  event, 
as  we  were  so  nearly  isolated  and  almost  hidden. 
We  made  very  little  account  at  the  time,  of  what  is 
now  considered  an  important  event  in  the  history  of 
the  battle.  It  then  apjDcared  to  us  as  only  one  of  the 
many  tragedies  in  the  great  slaughter.  Nothing  was 
done  at  the  time  to  mark  the  spot,  and  hardly  a  note 
of  the  event  was  recorded. 


b  GEN.    MANSFIELD    AT    ANTIETAM. 

REGIMENTAL   EXCURSION. 

In  1889,  the  i-io-29th  Maine  Regiment*  Associa- 
tion made  an  excursion  to  the  various  battle  fields  in 
Pennsylvania,  Maryland  and  Virginia  where  the  regi- 
ment had  fought.  Friday,  October  4th,  was  the  day 
of  the  visit  to  Antietam.  Not  one  of  the  company 
had  been  there  for  twenty-five  years,  yet  on  arriving 
in  East  Woods  we  readily  and  surely  identified  the 
fighting  position  of  the  regiment,  which  was  known 
as  the  "  Tenth  Maine,"  at  the  time  of  the  battle.  We 
found  that  the  west  face  of  the  woods  had  been  con- 
siderably cut  away,  and  that  many  of  the  trees  inside 
the  woods  had  been  felled,  but  there  was  no  serious 
change  in  the  neighborhood  where  we  fought,  except- 
ing that  a  road  had  been  laid  out  exactly  along  the 
line  of  battle  where  we  fired  our  first  volley.  We 
have  since  learned  that  in  1872,  the  County  bought  a 
fifteen  feet  strip  of  land,  961  feet  long,  bordering  that 
part  of  the  northeast  edge  of  the  woods,  which  lies 
between  Samuel  Poffenberger's  lane  and  the  Smoke- 
town  road,  and  moved  the  "  worm  fence  "  fifteen  feet 
into  the  field.!     Excepting  as  these  changes  affected 


*  These  three  organizations  were  virtually  one.  The  1st  Kegiment,  after 
serving  three  months  in  18G1,  re-organized  as  the  10th,  to  serve  till  May, 
1863,  when  it  was  again  recruited  and  re-organized  as  the  29th,  to  serve 
three  years  more.  Tlie  10th  Battalion  was  that  portion  of  the  10th  Regi- 
ment which  was  not  discharged  in  ISG'-l.  Excepting  eiglit  weeks  in  the  fall 
of  1861,  the  regiment  or  battalion  was  in  "  the  field  "  during  the  entire  war, 
and  for  more  than  a  year  afterward. 

t  The  map  does  not  show  this  new  or  "  Keedysville  road."  It  now  runs 
directly  past  Michael  Miller's  gate  to  Sam  Poffenberger's,  thence  up  Sam's 
old  lane  to  the  woods,  there  turning  west  enters  the  Smoketown  road,  where 
the  right  of  the  10th  Maine  fought — near  M  on  the  map.     The  lane  from 


GEN.    MANSFIELD    AT    ANTIETAM.  7 

the  view,  all  agreed  that  everything  in  our  vicinity 
had  a  "  natural  look."  The  chief  features  were  "  the 
bushes,"  directly  in  rear  of  our  right  companies ;  the 
Croasdale  Knoll,  further  to  the  right  and  rear ;  the 
Smoketown  Road,  which  enters  East  Woods  between 
the  bushes  and  the  Knoll,  and  runs  past  our  front 
through  the  woods;  the  low  land  in  our  right  front; 
the  "  open,"  easily  disccrnable  through  the  woods; 
the  rising  land  with  its  ledges,  big  and  little,  in  the 
front ;  the  denser  woods  in  the  left  front ;  the  worm 
fence  before  noted,  and  the  long  ledge  behind  it, 
against  which  our  left  companies  sheltered  themselves 
by  Captain  Jordan's  thoughtful  guidance ;  and  the 
gully  beginning  in  the  rear  of  bur  position  and  lead- 
ing down  to  the  great  stone  barn  and  stone  mansion,* 
with  its  immense  spring  of  water. 

The  large  oak  in  rear  of  our  right,  to  which  Col. 
Beal  crawled  after  he  was  wounded,  was  still  standing 
a  few  paces  up  (northeast)  the  Smoketown  road,  and 
another  good  sized  tree  nearer  the  front  was  recog- 
nized by  Capt.  (then  Sergt.)  Goss  as  the  one  from 
which  he  first  opened  fire.  Lt.-Col.  Emerson  (Capt. 
of  H,  the  right  Co.)  stood  where  he  stood  in  1862  and 
pointed  out  to  our  guests  place  after  place  which  he 
recognized. 

Many  of  "  the  bushes  "  of  1862  had  grown  into  siz- 
able trees ;  they,  with  Beal's  and  Goss's  trees  and  the 


M.  Miller's  to  Morrison's  lias  been  closed,   and  also  that  part  of  Sam's  lane 
which  was  in  East  Woods. 

*  Samuel  PofEenberger's.     Erroneously  marked  Dunbar's  Mills  on  the  old 
maps. 


O  GEN.    MANSFIELD    AT    ANTIETAM. 

Smoketown  road  fence,  had  been  a  serious  obstacle  to 
the  advance  of  our  right  companies. 

The  scar,  or  depression  in  the  ground,  where  we 
had  buried  a  few  of  our  dead  (northeast  of  Beal's  tree), 
was  still  visible,  but  repeated  plowing  since  1889  has 
entirely  effaced  it. 

Our  excursion  was  entirely  for  pleasure ;  we  had 
no  thought  of  controversy,  nor  even  of  the  enlight- 
enment of  the  Sharpsburg  people,  who  knew  nothing 
of  the  true  locality  where  Mansfield  was  wounded, 
but  were  showing  two  or  three  erroneous  places  to 
visitors.  We  defended  the  truth,  photographed  the 
position,  but  found  it  difficult  for  several  reasons  to 
decide  by  several  feet  upon  the  exact  spot  of  the 
wounding. 

It  is  necessary  now  to  go  back  to  1862  and  tell  the 
story  of  the  battle  as  seen  by  the  loth  Maine;  and 
as  since  the  war  a  generation  has  grown  up  that 
knows  nothing  of  the  way  soldiers  are  arranged  for 
marching  and  fighting,  it  is  best  to  give  a  great  many 
explanations  that  may  seem  unnecessary  to  an  old 
soldier. 

THE  PART  TAKEN  BY  THE  lOTH  MAINE. 

The  12th  Army  Corps,  Mansfield  commanding, 
marched  on  the  Boonsboro  pike,  late  at  night  of  Sept. 
1 6th,  from  "the  center"  through  Keedysville  to  the 
farm  of  George  Line  (G.  Lyons  on  the  old  maps)  and 
there  rested  till  daybreak.  Gen.  Mansfield  slept  on 
the  west  side  of  a  fence  which  ran  south  from  Line's 


GKX.    ]\1AX.SI'MKM)    AT    AXTIKTAM. 


garden  to  woods.  I  lis  bed  was  tlic  grass  and  l^is  roof  a 
blanket.  The  lotli  Maine  was  on  tlie  east  side  of  the 
fence  (see  map),  and  some  of  onr  boys  who  indulged 
in  loud  talk  were  ordered  by  the  General  to  lower 
their  tones  to  a  whisj^er.  The  other  regiments  of 
our  brigade  were  near  us,  while  the  other  brigades  of 
the  corps  apj^eared  to  be  behind  ours  (or  east). 
Our  brigade*  was  the  advance  of  the  corp\s,  and 
marched  a  little  before  s  o'clock  on  the  mornin^'-  of 
the  battle,  first  to  the  west  across  the  Smokctown 
road,  and  nearly  to  John  Poffenberger's,  and  then 
south  to  nearly  abreast  of  Joseph  Poffenberger's 
(marked  6.20  on  the  maj:)),  and  there  h;dted  for  almost 
an  hour,  during  all  of  which  tin'ie,  that  is  from  before 
5  A.  M.,  Hooker's  corps  was  fighting  in  and  around 
"  the  great  cornfield,"  the  enemy  being  south  and 
west  of  it. 

As  well  as  could  be  judged,  all  of  the  12th  corps 
followed  our  movements,  and  halted  to  the  right  or 
left  of  the  rear  of  our  brigade. 

The  124th  and  125th  Penn.  were  detached  from 
the  brigade  at  some  early  hour,  but  at  7,20  by  my 
watch,  which  may  have  been  five  to  ten  minutes  fast, 
the  other  four  regiments  were  started  for  the  fight. 

The  loth  Maine  w^as  guided  by  Gen.  Mansfield  in 
person.  We  had  all  seen  him  for  some  time  previ- 
ous sitting  on  his  horse  at  the  northwest  corner  of 
the  East  Wood,  marked  W  on  the  map.      He  hurried 


*  Crawford's  brigade,  4(5threnn.,  Col.  Kiiipe;  10th  Maine,  Col.  Beal;  28th 
N.Y.,  fragment,  Capt.  Mapes;  VIAVlx  Penn.,  Col.  Hawley;  12r)th  Penn.,  Col. 
liiggins;  128th  Penn.,  Col.  Samuel  Croasdale  (killed.) 


10  GEN.    MANSFIELD    AT    ANTIETAM. 

US,  first  to  the  front,  down  hill  through  a  field  where 
several  piles  of  stone  lay,  the  Smoketown  road  still 
being  on  our  left.  We  barely  entered  the  *'  ten  acre 
cornfield  "  when  Mansfield  beckoned  us  to  move  to 
our  left.  We  then  marched  a  few  steps  by  what  the 
tactics  call  "  Left  oblique,"  but  did  not  gain  ground 
to  the  left  sufficiently  to  suit  the  General,  so  Col. 
Beal  commanded  "  Left  flank,"  whereupon  each  man 
faced  east,  and  we  presently  knocked  over  the  two 
fences  of  the  Smoketown  road  and  marched  into 
Sam  Poffenberger's  field.  Wliile  going  across  the 
Smoketown  road  Gen.  Hooker  rode  from  the  woods 
(M)  and  told  Col.  Beal  ''  The  enemy  are  breaking 
through  my  lines ;  you  must  hold  these  woods," 
(meaning  East  Woods.) 

After  crossing  the  road,  bullets  from  the  enemy 
began  to  whiz  over  and  around  us.  WHien  well  into 
Sam  Poffenberger's  field  the  Colonel  commanded 
"  Right  flank,"  then  each  man  again  faced  south  (or 
west  of  south  to  be  more  exact)  and  we  all  marched 
straight  for  the  enemy,  whom  some  of  us  could  see  in 
the  woods,  close  to  where  our  Mansfield  marker  is 
now  standing,  marked  M  on  the  map. 

The  loth  Maine  was  in  "  double  column  at  half 
distance  "  (or  "double  column  in  mass,"  as  some  re- 
member.) , 


Colors. 


Left.     v>  =^===:     =^^^^=  K     Iliffht. 


GKN.    MANSFIKLI)    AT    ANTIETAM.  11 

Each  line  in  the  diagram  represents  about  15  men 
all  facing  "  front."  In  this  order  we  had  bivouacked  and 
marched  to  Sam  Poffenberger's  field,  only  that  while 
in  the  ten  acre  corn  field  every  man  turned  on  his 
left  heel  and  marched  toward  what  had  been  the  "  left," 
until  arriving  in  Sam  Poffenberger's  field,  where  a 
turn  of  each  man  to  his  right,  or  the  technical  "front," 
brought  us  to  our  original  position. 

Apparently  fifty  to  a  hundred  Confederates  were 
strung  along  the  fence  (M)  firing  at  us.  They  had 
the  immense  advantage  that  they  could  rest  their 
rifles  on  the  fence  and  fire  into  us,  massed  ten  ranks 
deep,  while  we  could   only  march  and  "take  it." 

It  was  high  time  to  deploy,*  and  Col.  Beal  pro- 
posed to  do  so,  but  Gen.  Mansfield  said  "  No,"  and  re- 
marked that  a  regiment  can  be  easier  handled  "  in 
mass  "  than  "  in  line  "  ;  which  is  very  true  in  the 
abstract.  Gen.  Mansfield  then  rode  away,  and  Col. 
Beal,  hardly  waiting  for  him  to  get  out  of  sight,  or- 
dered the  regiment  to  deploy  in  double  quick  time. 
Everybody  felt  the  need  of  haste. 

In  the  execution  of  this  order  Companies  I  and  G, 
with  the  color  guard,  continued  marching  straight 
ahead  at  the  ordinary   step,  just   as  if   no   order  had 


*Tliat  is,  to  bring  the  men  "into  line" — the  position  they  sliould  be  in 
for  finhting;  since  wliile  in  muss,  only  Companies  I  and  G  could  fire  their 
muskets,  while  a  fairly  well  aimed  bullet  from  tlu'  enemy  would  be  almost 
sure  to  hit  cue  or  more  of  us. 

Front. 

Colors. 

Left.       I  K  I  c  I  1)  I  i»  I  <i  j;  I  |lo"  I  K  I  A  I  H~|      Right. 

Deployed. 


12  GEN.    MANSFIELD    AT    ANTIETAM. 

been  given.  The  men  of  Cos  F,  C,  D  and  B  turned 
to  their  left  and  ran  east — toward  Sam  Poffenbersrer's 
Go's  H,  A,  K  and  E  turned  to  the  right  and  ran  west 
— toward  the  Smoketown  road.  As  fast  as  the 
respective  companies  "  uncovered,"  they  came  to 
"  Front  "  and  advanced  to  the  front,  still  running.  In 
other  words,  after  Co.  B  had  run  east  and  Co.  E  west, 
the  length  of  their  company,  each  man  turned  to  the 
front  (or  the  woods)  and  the  company  ran  till  B  was 
left  of  G,  and  E  was  right  of  I,  which  being  done  B 
and  E  quit  running  and  took  up  the  ordinary  step. 
It  will  be  seen  that  D  had  twice  as  far  to  run  to  the 
east,  and  K  twice  as  far  to  the  west,  and  that  G  and 
A  ran  three  times,  and  F  and  H  four  times  as  far  as 
B  and  E  had  done. 

I  have  been  so  circumstantial  in  describing  all  this 
for  two  reasons.  First,  because  standing  to-day  on 
the  battle  line  of  the  loth  Maine  (which  is  the  posi- 
tion the  enemy  occupied  at  the  time  the  loth  was  de- 
ploying), and  looking  over  the  fence  northeast  into 
Sam  Poffenberger's  field,  as  the  Confederates  did, 
one  will  see  how  it  was  that  when  the  loth  Me.,  with 
about  300  *  men,  came  to  deploy  and  to  advance 
afterward,  the  Smoketown  fence,  and  the  trees  of 
Beal  and  Goss,  with  "  the  bushes,"  were  an  obstacle 
to  the  right  companies,  and   the  ledge  would  have 


*  Tlie  10th  Maine  went  into  battle  with  21   officers,   and  27G  men  with 
muskets. 

Loss.     ;')  officers  and  28  men  killed  and  mortally  wounded. 

i)  officers  and  3.5  men  wounded. 

0  prisoners. 
Total  killed  and  wounded  71,  or  24  per  cent,  of  number  engaged. 


OKX.    MANSKIKM)    AT    ANTIKTAM.  13 

been  somewhat  so  to  tlic  left  companies  if  Capt.  Jor- 
dan hiul  not  iKilted  his  division*  beliind  it.  He  did 
this  for  shelter  as  the  first  reason,  and  because,  per- 
ceivinLi;  there  was  no  Union  force  on  our  left,  he  knew 
it  was  better  to  ha\'e  our  left  "  refused  "  and  hence 
not  so  easily  "  flanked  "  by  the  enemy.     (See  map.) 

Second,  and  more  ])articularly,  I  wish  to  state  that 
on  Nov.  9,  1S94,  Major  W'm.  N.  Robbins,  4th  Ala- 
bama, Law's  brii;ade,  Hood's  division  of  the  Confed- 
erate army,  met  me  by  appointment  on  the  field  and 
compared  experiences.  We  had  previously  had  a 
long  correspondence,  in  which  he  persistently  referred 
to  seeing  a  "  hesitating  "  Union  regiment  which  he 
ordered  his  troops  to  fire  into.  The  result  of  this 
fire  was  the  dispersion  of  the  Union  regiment,  where- 
upon he  himself  went  over  towards  his  left  and  at- 
tended to  affairs  nearer  the  great  cornfield.  After  a 
great  deal  of  correspondence  with  every  Union  and 
Confederate  regiment  that  fought  in  the  vicinity,  I 
could  not  learn  of  any  Union  regiment  that  was  dis- 
persed, either  in  Sam  Poffenberger's  field,  or  in  the 
"  field  of  stone  piles,"  nor  could  the  Major  determine, 
by  consulting  the  map  alone,  whether  it  was  the 
Smoketown  road  or  Joe  Poffenberger's  bypath  that 
was  on  his  left  when    the  Union  regiment   dispersed. 

In  November,  '94,  when  we  met  on  the  ground,  he 
was  sure  that  the  Smoketown  road  was  on  his  left. 
Hence  it  was  plain  that  it  could  be  only  the  loth 
Maine  that  "  dispersed." 

Yet  we  certainly  did  not ! ! 

*  A  regimental  division  is  two  companies;  C  and  F  in  tlic  present  case. 


14  GEN.    MANSFIELD    AT    ANTIETAM. 

For  a  little  while  it  was  a  very  dark  problem  ;  then 
it  dawned  upon  me  that  from  where  the  Major  stood  he 
did  not  see  (because  of  the  slight  rise  of  land  between 
us)  the  movement  of  our  center  and  right  as  we  de- 
ployed, while  the  running  to  the  east  of  Go's  F,  C,  D 
and  G  appeared  to  him  precisely  like  a  dispersion. 
I  do  not  know  a  better  illustration  of  how  difficult  it 
is  to  see  things  in  battle  as  they  really  are  happening. 

With  this  vexed  question  settled,  it  becomes  easier 
to  understand  the  movements  of  other  regiments,  but 
these  do  not  concern  us  now,  further  than  that  there 
was  no  other  regiment  at  the  time  and  place  for  Maj. 
Robbins  to  "  disperse." 

The  result  of  this  extensive  correspondence  assures 
me  that  Gen.  Mansfield  was  wounded  by  Maj.  Rob- 
bins'  command,  to  which  I  will  refer  presently. 

The  reader  will  readily  see  how  easily  we  can  re- 
member these  prominent  features  of  the  field,  and 
how  surely  we  can  identify  our  old  position  after  the 
lapse  of  years.  We  are  not  confronted  with  the  diffi- 
cult task  which  those  have  who  fought  in  the  open 
field  with  no  striking  landmarks  near ;  and  where 
the  position  of  the  fences  have  been  changed. 

To  resume  the  narrative  :  The  enemy  fell  back 
as  we  approached.  On  arriving  at  the  fence,  we 
opened  fire,  and  then  rushed  into  the  woods  for  such 
cover  as  the  trees,  &c.,  offered.  The  enemy  also  was 
well  scattered  through  the  woods,  behind  numerous 
ledges,  logs,  trees  and  piles  of  cord  wood,  a  few  men 
only  being  east  of  the  Smoketown  road,  which  at  that 
time  was  not  fenced. 


GEN.    MANSFIELD    AT    ANTIETAM.  15 

The  fire  of  the  enemy  was  exceedingly  well  aimed ; 
and  as  the  distance  between  us  was  only  about  one 
hundred  yards  we  had  a  bloody  time  of  it. 

We  had  fired  only  a  few  rounds,  before  some  of  us 
noticed  Gens.  Mansfield  and  Crawford,  and  other 
mounted  officers,  over  on  the  Croasdale  Knoll,  which, 
with  the  intervening  ground,  was  open  woods. 
Mansfield  at  once  came  galloping  down  the  hill  and 
passed  through  the  scattered  men  of  the  right  com- 
panies, shouting  "  Cease  firing,  you  are  firing  into  our 
own  men  !  "  He  rode  very  rapidly  and  fearlessly  till 
he  reached  the  place  where  our  line  bent  to  the  rear 
(behind  the  fence).  Captain  Jordan  now  ran  forward 
as  far  as  the  fence,  along  the  top  of  the  ledge  behind 
which  his  division  was  sheltered,  and  insisted  that  Gen. 
Mansfield  should  "  Look  and  see."  He  and  Sergt. 
Burnham  pointed  out  particular  men  of  the  enemy, 
who  were  not  50  yards  away,  that  were  then  aiming 
their  rifles  at  us  and  at  him.  Doubtless  the  General 
was  wounded  while  talking  with  Jordan  ;  at  all  events 
he  was  convinced,  and  remarked,  "  Yes,  you  are 
right."  He  then  turned  his  horse  and  passed  along 
to  the  lower  land  where  the  fence  was  down,  and  at- 
tempted to  go  through,  but  the  horse,  which  also  ap- 
peared to  be  wounded,  refused  to  step  into  the  trap- 
like mass  of  rails  and  rubbish,  or  to  jump  over.  The 
General  thereupon  promptly  dismounted  and  led  the 
horse  into  Sam  Poffenberger's  field.  I  had  noticed 
the  General  when  he  was  with  Crawford  on  the 
Croasdale  Knoll,  and  had  followed  him  with  my  eye 
in  all  his  ride.     Col.  Beal  was   having  a  great  deal  of 


16  GEN.    MANSFIELD    AT    ANTIETAM. 

trouble  with  his  horse,  which  was  wounded  and  ap- 
peared to  be  trying  to  throw  the  Colonel,  and  I  was 
slow  in  starting  from  the  Colonel  to  see  what  Mans- 
field's gestures  meant.  I  met  him  at  the  gap  in  the 
fence.  As  he  dismounted  his  coat  blew  open,  and  I 
saw  that  blood  was  streaming  clown  the  right  side  of 
his  vest. 

The  General  was  very  quick  in  all  his  motions  and 
attempted  to  mount  as  soon  as  the  horse  had  got 
through  the  fence ;  but  his  strength  was  evidently 
failing,  and  he  yielded  to  the  suggestion  that  we 
should  take  him  to  a  surgeon.  What  became  of  the 
orderly  and  the  horse  none  of  us  noticed.  Sergt. 
Joe  Merrill,  of  Co.  F,  helped  carry  the  General  off; 
a  young  black  man,  who  had  just  come  uj)  tlie  ravine 
from  the  direction  of  Sam  Poffenberger  s,  was  pressed 
into  service.  He  was  very  unwilling  to  come  with 
us,  as  he  was  hunting  for  Capt.  Somebody's*  frying- 
pan,  the  loss  of  which  disturbed  him  more  than  the 
National  calamity.  Joe  Merrill  was  so  incensed  at 
the  Contraband's  sauciness,  his  indifference  to  the 
danger,  and  his  slovenly  way  of  handling  the  General, 
that  he  begged  me  to  put  down  the  General  and  "  fix 
things."  It  turned  out  that  Joe's  intention  was  to 
"  fix "  the  darkey,  whom  he  cuffed  and  kicked  most 
unmercifully.  We  then  got  a  blanket  and  other  men, 
and  I  started  off  ahead  of  the  re-formed  squadf  to 
find  a  Suro-eon. 


*  He  named  an  officer  and  regiment  of  Hooker's  Corps,  both  of  which  I 
forgot  before  the  day  was  ended. 

f  Sergt.  Joe  Merrill,  Co.  F;  Private  Storer  S.  Knight,  Co.  B;  Trivate 
James  Sheridan,  Co.  C. 


(iKN.    MANSFIKLI)    AT    ANTIKTAM.  17 

The  road  had  appeared  to  be  full  of  ambulances  a 
half  hour  before,  but  all  were  gone  now  and  we  carried 
the  General  clear  to  Sam  Poffenberger's  woods. 
Here  I  saw  Gen.  Geo.  H.  Gordon,  commanding  the 
3d  brigade  of  our  division,  told  him  the  story  and 
asked  him  to  send  an  orderly  or  aide  for  a  surgeon, 
but  he  said  he  could  not  as  he  had  neither  with  him. 
He  was  moving  the  107th  N.  Y.,  a  new,  large  reg- 
iment; an  ambulance  was  found  and  two  medical  offi- 
cers, just  inside  the  woods,  a  few  steps  north  of  where 
Sam  Poffenberger's  gate  now  hangs,  marked  K  on 
the  map.  The  younger  doctor  put  a  flask  to  the  Gen- 
eral's mouth.  The  whiskey,  or  whatever  it  was, 
choked  the  General  and  added  greatly  to  his  distress. 
We  put  the  General  into  the  ambulance  and  that  was 
the  last  I  saw  of  him.  Lieut.  Edw.  R.  Witman,  46th 
Penn.,  an  aide  to  Gen.  Crawford,  had  been  sent  back 
by  Gen.  Crawford,  who  evidently  saw  Mansfield  in 
his  fatal  ride.  I  turned  over  ambulance*  and  all  to 
him  and  returned  to  the  regiment ;  but  when  I  arrived 
I  found  that  Tyndale's  and  Stainrook's  brigades  of 
Greene's  division  had  swept  the  woods  a  little  while 
after  I  had  gone,  carrying  a  dozen  or  two  of  the  loth 
with  them,  and  that  Gen.  Gordon  had  followed  later 
with  the  107th  New  York.  Only  twenty  or  thirty 
men  of  the  loth  Maine  were  left  on  the  ground; 
the  colors  and  the  others  had  gone  out  and  taken 
position  somewhere  back  of  the  Croasdale  Knoll. 


*  Doctor  Francis  B.  Davidson,  of  the  12')tli  Tenn.,  met  tlic  ambulance  near 
Line's  house  and  turned  it  in  there,  and  there  the  General  wa.s  treated  and 
died,  as  everybody  knows. 


18  GEN.    MANSFIELD    AT    ANTIETAM. 

We  buried  some  of  the  dead  of  our  regiment  in  the 
north  edge  of  "  the  bushes,"  near  to  the  Smoketown 
road  fence.  During  the  remainder  of  the  day  a  very 
laree  number  of  the  ofhcers  and  men  of  the  reo^iment 
were  detailed  by  various  medical  officers  to  bring  off 
wounded  men  from  "  the  cornfield  "  and  woods,  for 
the  ambulance  department  was  not  organized  at  that 
time  as  it  was  later  in  the  war,  and  was  not  equal  to 
the  task. 

We  also  buried  the  Confederate  dead  that  fell  in 
our  immediate  front,  but  somehow  the  cracker-box 
head  boards  were  marked  (20  GEO),  and  this  little 
error  made  trouble  enough  for  me  as  Historian  of  the 
regimental  association. 

At  niixht  we  bivouacked  north  of  Sam  Poffcnbero^- 
er's  woods,  and  on  the  iSth  marched  into  East  Woods, 
just  beyond  where  we  fought,  halted,  stacked  arms, 
and  during  the  truce  dispersed  to  look  at  all  the 
sights  in  our  neighborhood. 

On  the  19th  we  were  moved  into  the  woods  again 
and  took  a  more  extended  view  of  the  field. 

In  June,  1863,  the  loth  Maine  Battalion,  in  its 
march  to  Gettysburg,  passed  near  the  field,  and  four 
or  five  of  those  who  had  been  in  the  battle  turned 
aside  to  see  the  old  grounds.  The  graves  near  "  the 
bushes  "  and  those  of  the  "  20th  Georgia"  were  just  as 
we  left  them. 

Lt.-Col.  Fillebrown  also  visited  the  field  some  time 
during  the  war,  and  a  party  was  sent  out  to  bring 
home  the  remains  of  Capt.  Furbish,  which  had  been 
buried  near  Sam  Poffenberger's. 


GKN.    MANSFIELD    AT    ANTIETAM.  19 

It  will  therefore  be  seen  that  almost  every  one  of 
the  loth  Maine,  who  came  out  of  the  battle  unharmed, 
had  a  chance  to  view  the  field  and  to  impress  its  to- 
pographical features  in  his  mind.  Therefore,  when  a 
dozen  or  more  of  us  who  had  fought  in  the  battle, 
visited  the  field  in  1889,  we  had  no  difficulty  what- 
ever in  finding  our  locality,  and  our  testimony  is  suffi- 
cient ;  but  more  can  be  cited. 

Mr.  Sam  Poffenberger,  by  whom  I  have  been  most 
hospitably  entertained  in  two  of  my  trips  (1891  and 
1894),  assures  me  that  the  loth  Maine  graves  re- 
mained near  "  the  bushes  "  until  removed  to  the  Na- 
tional Cemetery.  He  also  says  the  graves  of  the 
iiith  Penn.  Vols.,  during  all  that  time,  were  under 
the  ledge  where  tlie  left  of  our  regiment  (Co.  F) 
rested.     The  iiith  Penn.  Vols,  relieved  us. 

The  course  of  the  march  of  the  107th  N.  Y.  has 
been  identified  by  members  of  that  regiment  who 
have  visited  the  field ;  and  letters  from  several  of 
them  confirm  the  statements  made  on  page  17. 

The  line  of  march  of  the  3d  Maryland  and  i02d 
N.  Y.,  who  were  on  the  left  of  the  iiith  Penn.  Vols., 
has  been  fully  identified  and  exactly  joins  our  identi- 
fication. 

For  substantial  evidence  of  the  truth  of  our  narra- 
tive we  will  say  that  Maj.  Jordan  still  has  the  cord 
which  fell  from  the  General's  hat  as  he  waved  it  at 
our  left  companies  in  trying  to  make  them  cease  fir- 
ing. 

The  hat  itself,  which  fell  off  inside  the  fence  when 
the  General  iiavc  himself  into  the  care  of  Joe  Merrill 


20  GEN.    MANSFIELD    AT    ANTIETAM. 

and  the  others  of  us,  got  into  the  hands  of  Gen.  Nye 
(Capt.  of  Co.  K)  and  he  forwarded  it  to  the  family,  and 
has  the  acknowledgment  of  receipt  of  the  same. 

Geo.  W.  Knowlton,  Esq.,  Boston,  Mass.,  has  a  pair 
of  blood-stained  gloves  sent  home  by  his  father,  Maj. 
Wm.  Knowlton,  (Capt.  Co.  F,  but  not  present  at  An- 
tietam)  who  wrote  and  afterward  explained  to  Mrs. 
Knowlton  that  one  of  his  men  picked  them  up  and 
gave  them  to  him. 

It  will  now  be  seen  that  thouo:h  the  resfimental  ex- 
cursion  of  1889  was  positive  of  the  position  of  the 
regiment,  we  could  not  decide  exactly  where  Mans- 
field fell,  for  it  so  happened  that  the  main  witnesses 
of  the  wounding  were  not  then  present.  On  return- 
turning  home,  I  made  a  special  study  of  the  facts, 
and  found  that  Maj.  Jordan  was  sure  he  could  find 
"  the  boulder  "  which  he  mounted  to  attract  the  atten- 
tion of  Gen.  Mansfield.  Maj.  Redlon,  who  was  in 
command  of  Co.  D,  a  man  of  remarkable  memory 
and  faculty  of  observation,  also  assured  me  that  Maj. 
Jordan  was  there.  Jordan  is  a  short  man,  and  nat- 
urally mounted  the  ledge  to  "  get  even  "  with  the  Gen- 
eral. Sergeant  Burnham,  of  Co.  C,  while  living,  fre- 
quently spoke  of  this  to  me. 

On  September  17,  1891,  Maj.  Jordan,  Surgeon 
Howard  and  myself  accepted  the  invitation  of  the 
125th  Penn.  to  visit  the  field  with  them.  Major  Jor- 
dan readily  found  the  ledge  without  my  assistance, 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  i6th,  but  "  the  boulder*  "  was 


*  An  out-cropping  spur  of  limestone  ledge,  common  all  over  the  field. 


OKN.     MANSKIKLU    AT    ANTIETAM.  21 

not  visible.  During  the  evening  Mr.  Sam.  Poffen- 
beru:er  told  of  the  chan<^e  of  fence  and  the  buildino; 
of  the  new  road. 

Early  in  the  morning  we  went  again,  and  there 
under  the  fence,  with  a  small  red  cedar  growing  over 
it,  was  "  the  boulder."  We  easily  changed  the  fence 
and  obliterated  the  road  in  our  mind's  eyes,  and 
thereupon  everything  came  out  clearly.  We  know 
precisely  where  the  General  sat  on  his  horse  when 
he  talked  with  Jordan,  and  there  it  is,  as  we  under- 
stand it,  he  was  wt)unded.  We  borrowed  tools  from 
our  host  and  set  up  our  marker  forthwith  for  the 
edification  of  our  125th  Penn,  comrades,  who  soon 
came  troojiing  down  on  us.  Maj.  Jordan  staid  by 
his  marker  all  day,  defending  the  truth  most  vigor- 
ously. I  went  with  Capt,  Gardner  and  Lieut.  Dune- 
gan  to  the  place  where  they  say  Mansfield  fell  from 
his  saddle  and  was  borne  off  by  two  of  their  men. 
The  place  is  about  600  yards  from  where  Mansfield 
was  shot.  From  others  of  the  125th  it  was  evident 
that  Gen.  Mansfield's  riderless  horse  did  bring  up  at 
about  the  })lace  pointed  out,  but  we  know  the  fatal 
shot  came  to  the  (ieneral  himself  while  he  halted  in 
front  of  Captain  Jordan, 

The  thoroughly  good  feeling  shown  to  us  by  all  of 
these  good  fellows  of  the  old  125th  has  not  been  for- 
gotten, and  never  can  be;  and  in  telling  the  true 
story  I  am  not  a  little  embarrassed  with  the  fact  that 
I  seem  to  make  reflections  upon  some  of  them. 


22  GEN.    MANSFIKLD    AT    ANTIKTAM. 

THE  CONFEDERATES. 

It  has  been  stated  that  the  loth  Maine  was  the  ex- 
treme left  of  Hooker's  command  (ist  and  12th 
corps)  during  the  40  minutes,  more  or  less,  the  regi- 
ment was  engaged.  The  Confederate  troops  opposed 
to  us  and  to  our  neighbors*  on  the  right  were  from 
Hood's  division.! 

The  4th  Alabama  was  the  right  regiment  of  all,  and 
they  came  up  the  Smoketown  road  from  the  West 
Woods  in  a  hurry.  On  reaching  East  Woods  they 
deployed  and  advanced  "inline."  On  nearing  the 
woods  Maj.  Robbins  met  what  he  understood  at  the 
time  was  a  half  regiment  of  Georgia  troops,  who  told 
him  they  had  already  been  in  the  fight  and  would  go 
in  again.  He  ordered  them  to  form  on  his  right  and 
advance  in  line  with  him.  All  was  done  in  great 
haste,  and  in  consequence  of  this  and  the  broken 
character  of  the  woods  and  the  rush  for  shelter,  the 
two  commands  were  mixed  all  together,  the  Georgians, 
however,  being  naturally  in  preponderance  on  the 
Confederate  right.  Some  time  after  they  had  been 
engaged  the  5th  Texas,  under  Capt.  Turner,  was  sent 
in  by  Gen.  Hood,  and  they  mixed  in  with  the  others 
wherever  a  chance  offered.  All  this  I  have  learned 
by  correspondence  with  many  members  from  each  of 
Hood's  regiments. 


*  These  were,  as  we  understand,  the  128th  Penn.,  a  new,  large  regiment, 
and  the  fragments  of  the  28th  N.  Y.  and  40th  Peini.  I  have  not  definitely 
learned  exactly  where  the  last  two  were  while  the  10th  Maine  was  fighting, 
but  we  saw  very  plainly  the  128th  Penn.  upon  the  Croasdale  Ivnoll. 

t  Law's  brigade  and  Wofford's  or  "  The  Texas  "  brigade. 


GEN.    MAN.SKIKI.)>    AT    ANTIKTAM.  Uo 

After  a  long  and  intensely  cxcitinL;-  hunt  for  the 
Georo^ia  reiriment  that  this  battalion  belonired  to — 
Major  Robl)ins  renienilx'rinL;-  only  that  their  number 
was  "in  the  twenties" — I  hax-e  learned  that  it  was 
the  skirmisher  battalion  of  (len.  Cr)lquitt's  brigade  of 
D.  H.  Hill's  division,  eom[)osed  of  one  company  each 
(Co.  A  generally)  from  the  five  regiments  of  his  brig- 
ade, viz:  6th,  23d,  27th  and  28th  Georgia  and  13th 
Alabama,  under  Capt.  Wm.  M.  Arnold,  of  the  6th 
Georgia.  We  therefore  made  a  mistake  in  the  num- 
ber only  when  we  marked  those  head  boards  "  20 
Georofia."  This  battalion  Gfot  into  the  fisfht  an  hour 
or  more  before  their  brigade  and  fought  independently 
of  it.  The  troops  under  Robbins,  Turner  and  Arnold 
are  the  only  Confederates,  so  far  as  I  can  learn,  that 
did  heavy  fighting  in  East  Woods.*  There  were  no 
better  troops  in  the  Confederate  army ;  they  suffered 
a  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  of  nearly  one-half,  and 
probably  inflicted  a  still  larger  numerical  loss  upon 
the  Union  troops. 

OFFICIAL   REPORTS. 

We  will  next  look  at  the  Official  Reports  bearing 
on  the  subject.  (See  Vol.  XIX,  Part  I,  Official 
Record,  War  of  the  Rebellion,  U.  S.  Gov't  j^rinting 
office.) 

I.     In    Lt.-Col.  Fillebrown'st   report  (loth  Maine) 

*  Garland's  brigade  was  in  tli(!  wodds  a  sliort  tinit',  and  a  few  men  from 
some  Confederate  command  were  in  the  extreme  northern  edge  when  Tyn- 
dale  approached  it. 

t  Dear  old  "  Jim"  has  long  since  "  passed  over  to  the  other  side,"  and  I 
cannot  tell  why  he  made  such  a  strange  report,  nor  why  he  didn't  let  me, 
Ms  Adjutant,  know  about  it  and  have  a  copy  to  tile  away. 


24  GEN.    MANSFIKLD    AT    ANTIETAM. 

there  is  no  mention  of  the  event,  nor  is  there  any- 
thing else  that  has  the  merit  of  being  both  true  and 
worth  recording.     (See  page  489.) 

Ordinarily  he  was  one  of  the  most  genial  and 
accommodating  of  men  ;  but  when  sick  and  vexed,  as 
plainly  he  was  when  he  made  that  report,  he  could 
dash  off  just  such  a  jumble,  and  send  it  in  to  head 
quarters  before  the  ink  was  dry. 

It  is  due  to  him  to  say  that  he  was  run  over  and 
kicked  in  the  bowels  by  Col.  Beal's  horse  just  at  the 
moment  Col.  Beal  himself  was  wounded  ;  and  when, 
but  for  the  untimely  kick,  "  Jim  "  might  have  led  us 
on  to  victory  and  covered  himself  with  glory. 

II.  In  Col.  Jacob  Higgins' (125th  Penn.)  report  we 
have — 

"Previous  to  this  Gen.  Mansfield  fell,  some  of  my  men  carry- 
"  ing  him  off  the  field  on  their  mnskets  until  a  blanket  was  pro- 
«  cured."     (Page  492,  Vol.  XIX.) 

It  cannot  be  determined  from  the  report,  exactly 
when  or  where  "  this  "  was ;  but  it  was  plainly  early 
in  the  morning  and  before  the  125th  entered  West 
Wood,  where  (and  not  in  East  Wood)  they  fought. 

This  report  annoyed  me  much  when  I  first  saw  it 
in  1887,  but  Col.  Higgins  has  written  to  me  that  he 
knows  nothing  personally  of  the  event  but  reported 
it  because  officers  whom  he  trusted  assured  him  it 
was  so. 

III.  Col.  Knipe,  (46  Penn.)  who  made  the  brigade 
report,  simply  mentions  that  Mansfield  was  wounded. 

IV.  In  Gen.  Crawford's  report  we  read : 


GEN.    MANSFIELD    AT    ANTIETAM.  25 

« Gen.  Mansfield,  the  eori)S  coinniander,  had  been  mortally 
"wounded,  and  was  borne  past  my  position  to  the  rear."  (l*age 
485,  Vol.  XTX,  Part  I.) 

This  "  position  "  is  not  defined  further  than  to  state 
that  it  was  "  Miller's  "  woods,  or  "  East  woods,"  as  we 
now  call  them. 

V.  Gen.  Williams,  commanding;  ist  division  and 
succeeding  Mansfield  in  command  of  the  corps,  says: 

"  While  the  deployment  [of  the  12th  eorps]  was  going  on  and 
<'  before  tlie  leading  regiments  were  fairly  engaged,  it  was  re- 
"  ported  to  me  that  the  veteran  and  distinguished  commander 
"  of  the  corps  was  mortally  wounded."     (Page  475,  Vol.  XIX.) 

VI.  Gen.  Geo.  H.  Gordon,  commanding  3d  brig- 
ade, ist  division,  says  : 

"  Gen.  ]Manstield  liad  been  mortally  wounded  at  th('  commence- 
"ment  of  tlie  action,  while  making  a  bohl  reconnoissance  of  the 
"woods  through  which  we  had  just  dashed."  (Page  495,  VoL 
XIX.) 

VII.  We  find  the  following  in  the  report  of  Gen. 
Edwin  V.  Sumner,  "commanding  2d  and  12th  corps." 
tie  also  cc^mmanded  the  ist  corps  upon  his  arrival  in 
our  part  of  the  field,  about  9  a.  m.  : 

"  General  ]\Ianslield,  a  wortliy  and  gallant  veteran,  was  un- 
"  fortunately  mortally  wounded  while  leading  his  corps  into 
"  action."     (Page  275,  Vol.  XIX.) 

VIII.  Gen.  Hooker,  commanding  ist  corps  and 
having  the  12th  under  his  orders,  makes  no  mention 
of  the  wounding. 

IX.      Gen.    McClellan,    commanding   the    Union 
army,  thus  refers  to  the  deployment  of  the  12th  corps: 


26  GEN.    MANSFIELD    AT    ANTIETAM. 

<'  During  the  deployment,  that  gallant  veteran,  Gen.  Mansfield, 
"fell  mortally  wounded  while  examining  the  ground  in  front  of 
"his  troops."     (Page  56,  Vol.  XIX.) 

It  should  be  stated  that  Vol.  XIX  was  not  published 
until  October,  1887 — twenty-five  years  after  the  battle. 

Besides  these  unsatisfactory  official  reports,  we  have 
the  following  authentic  accounts,  that  have  been 
made  public  from  time  to  time,  and  should  have 
furnished  the  world  with  the  truth,  I  noticed  that 
the  newspapers  of  the  day  had  little  to  say  about  the 
event;  accordingly,  a  few  weeks  after  the  battle  I 
wrote  an  account  and  forwarded  it  to  my  father,  who 
sent  it  to  the  Hon.  Benjamin  Douglas,  a  prominent 
citizen  of  Middletown,  Conn. — Mansfield's  home. 
Mr.  Douglas  acknowledged  the  receipt,  and  showed 
his  appreciation  when  we  were  publishing  our  regi- 
mental history,*  by  furnishing  gratis  the  portraits  of 
the  general.  This  letter  was  published  in  the  Port- 
land, Me.,  papers. 

The  regimental  history,  published  in  1S71,  has  a 
very  minute  account  of  the  event.  About  700  copies 
of  it  were  sold. 

The  report  for  1862  of  the  Adjutant  General  of 
Maine  also  has  a  narrative  of  the  battle,  embraced  in 
the  report  of  Col.  Beal,  who  returned  to  duty  before 
the  end  of  the  year.     (Page  74,  main  report.) 


*  History  lst-10th-29tli  Maine  regiment.  May  3,  1861,  to  June  21,  1866. 
Stephen  Berry,  Publisher,  Portland,  Me. 


GEN.    MANSFIKM>    AT    ANTIKTAM.  27 

GENERALS  AND  STAFF  DID  NOT  WITNESS. 

A  singular  phase  in  this  case  is  the  fact  that  none 
of  Gen.  Mansfield's  suljordinate  commanders  except- 
ing Gen.  Crawford,  and  none  of  Mansfield's  staff,  wit- 
nessed the  wounding.  In  the  three  days  he  was  our 
commander  none  of  us  saw  a  staff  officer  with  him. 
It  was  only  a  vague  memory  of  a  lost  and  forgotten 
general  order,  and  the  reference  to  "  Captain  Dyer  " 
in  the  General's  memorial  volume,*  that  suggested 
the  possibility  there  was  a  staff.  In  1890  to  '94  I 
made  a  special  and  persistent  effort  to  learn  who  his 
staff  were ;  also  who  was  the  orderly  and  who  the 
colored  servant  that  we  saw  with  him.  The  orderly 
and  servant  we  have  not.  found.  After  much  writing 
I  learned  that  Samuel  M.  Mansfield,!  a  s :)n  of  the 
General,  had  been  appointed  an  Aide  but  had  not 
been  able  to  join  his  father.  Maj.  Clarence  H.  Dyer, 
at  that  time  Captain  and  A.  A.  G.,  had  accompanied 
the  General  from  Washington  and  was  on  duty  with 
him  till  his  death. 

Furthermore,  Gen.  James  W.  Forsyth,  then  a  Cap- 
tain, (familiarly  known  as  "  Toney")  was  temporarily 
assigned  as  aide-de-camp  to  Mansfield  by  Gen. 
McClellan,  at  whose  head  quarters  Forsyth  was  then 
serving.  These  two  were  "  present " ;  but  Gen. 
Mansfield  kept  them  flying  so  constantly  that  none 
of  us  recoijnized  them  as  his  staff. 


*  Memorial  of  Gen.  Mansfield,  United  States  Army,  Boston,  T.  li.  Marvin 
&  Son,  18()2. 

t  Now  Lt.-Col.  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A. 


28  GEN.    MANSFIELD    AT    ANTIETAM. 

There  are  also  shadowy  hints  from  various  sources 
that  a  Lieutenant  of  cavalry,  name  and  regiment  not 
stated,  lost  his  opportunity  for  a  day  of  glory  by  too 
frequent  sips  of  what  was  known  as  "  commissary." 

Gen.  Forsyth  writes  (1891)  that  he  was  sent  by 
Mansfield  to  "  bring  up  the  divisions  of  the  corps  " 
and  that  he  "  was  not  with  Gen.  Mansfield  when  he 
received  his  death  wound." 

Maj.  Dyer  writes  (1891): 

''  At  the  time  the  General  was  mortally  wounded,  I  was  not 
"near  him,  as  he  had  given  me  an  order  to  bring  the  command 
"  of  Gen.  Crawford  to  the  front.  It  was  halted  somewhat  to 
"  the  rear  and  our  left.  When  I  returned  I  found  that  the 
"  General  was  being  removed  to  the  rear,  but  by  the  men  of 
"what  regiment  I  do  not  know.  I  remained  witli  him  until  he 
"died,  wliich  must  have  been  about  1  o'clock  p.  m.,  17th.  *  * 
"  Where  the  General  fell  was  a  little  to  our  left  of  the  woods — 
"a  cornfield  was  direiitly  in  front.  I  am  very  sure  that  the 
"  General  was  not  killed  by  the  men  of  the  [Confederate]  com- 
"  mand  in  front  of  the  10th  Maine.     I  am  positive  as  to  this." 

Here   is  another  instance  how   impossible  it  is  to 

see    everything  as  it  is  in   battle.     Apparently  Maj. 

Dyer   did   not  see   the    General   hurrying  the  loth 
Maine  across  the  brigade  front. 

GEN.    HANSFIELD'S    HISTAKE. 

The  next  question  that  arises  is,  why  did  Gen.  Mans- 
field suppose  the  loth  Maine  was  firing  into  Union 
troops  ? 

While  the  corps  was  waiting  in  the  vicinity  of  Joe 
Poffenberger's,  (marked  6:20  on  the  map)  from  about 


GKN.    MANSFIELn    AT    ANTIETAM.  29 

6:20  to  7:20  A.M.,  Gen.  Mansfield  was  seen  frequentl}' 
by  almost  every  soldier  of  the  corps.  In  hundreds  of 
letters,  from  the  various  regiments  and  batteries, 
there  is  a  common  agreement  that  the  General  was 
moving  around  the  field  continually,  lie  seemed  to 
be  everywhere.  Although  he  appeared  like  a  calm 
and  dignified  old  gentleman  when  he  took  command 
of  the  corps  two  days  before,  on  this  fatal  morning 
he  was  the  personification  of  vigor,  dash  and  enthusi- 
asm. As  before  stated,  he  remained  some  minutes 
at  the  northwest  corner  of  East  Woods  (W  on  the 
map),  observing  the  battle.  One  gets  a  fine  view  of 
the  field  from  there  and  he  must  have  orot  a  ofood  in- 
sight  into  the  way  Hooker's  corps  was  fighting.  Pre- 
sumably the  tide  was  turning  against  Hooker,  and  as 
likely  Mansfield  had  been  called  upon  by  him  for  re- 
inforcements, but  when  Mansfield  left  the  northwest 
corner  to  set  his  corps  in  motion,  the  East  Woods, 
if  I  have  rightly  interpreted  the  reports  and  corre- 
spondence, was  still  in  possession  of  Union  troops. 
Probal^ly,  almost  at  the  same  time  that  Mansfield 
quitted  his  lookout,  the  Confederate  brigade  of  Eaw 
(Hood's  division)  came  charging  out  of  West  Woods, 
the  4th  Alabama  on  the  right  running  uj)  the  Smoke- 
town  road,  as  before  stated,  and  entering  the  woods 
at  the  south-west  corner  where  the  Georgia  battalion 
joined  on  its  right.  The  movements  of  all  of  Hood's 
troops  were  exceedingly  rapid. 

How  much  time  elapsed  from  Mansfield's  leaving 
his  lookout  to  his  being  wounded,  I  can  only  roughly 
estimate  at  from    fifteen    to   twenty   minutes,   but   it 


30  GEN.    MANSFIELD    AT    ANTIETAM. 

was  time  enough  to  change  the  condition  of  affairs 
very  materially,  and  I  cannot  help  thinking  the  time 
passed  very  quickly  to  him,  and  that  he  did  not  real- 
ize the  fact  that  the  remnants  of  Rickett's  division 
had  been  driven  out  of  the  woods  and  cornfield,  nor 
even  did  he  suppose  it  was  possible.  Wise  or  un- 
wise, it  was  entirely  in  keeping  with  everything  else 
the  General  did  during  the  three  days  he  was  with  us, 
for  him  to  come  himself  and  see  what  we  were  doing; 
and  like  everything  else,  he  did  it  with  the  utmost 
promptness.  It  was  this  habit  of  personal  attention 
to  details,  and  his  other  characteristic  of  rapid  flying 
here  and  there,  that  make  it  so  dif^ficult  for  many  of 
the  soldiers  of  the  12th  corps  to  believe  he  was 
wounded  when  and  where  he  was. 


A  WORD  IN  CLOSING. 

In  this  narrative  it  has  been  impossible  to  avoid 
frequent  reference  to  myself  and  to  my  regiment,  but 
there  is  nothing  in  the  Mansfield  incident  of  special 
credit  to  any  of  us.  We  were  there  and  saw  it;  we 
live  and  can  prove  it ;  this  is  the  whole  story  in  a  nut 
shell. 

I  have  always  regretted  that  I  left  the  regiment  even 
on  so  important  a  mission.  At  the  time,  I  supposed 
it  was  only  to  be  for  a  moment,  and  that  with  three 
field  officers  on  duty  I  could  be  spared.  As  for  the 
regiment,  we  succeeded  so  very  much  better  later  in 
the  war,  that  we  have  not  been  in  the  hal3it  of  mak- 
ing great  claims  for  the  part  we   took   in   Antietam. 


GKX.    MANSPMKLI)    AT    AXTIKTAM. 


Many  other  Uni<in  refrimcnts  fou<j:ht  lon2:cr,  strucrirled 
liardcr,  did  more  effective  service  and  lost  more  men 
than  we. 

Tlie  Confederates  opposed  to  us  appeared  to  be 
equal  to  us  in  numbers  and  they  were  superior  in  ex- 
perience and  all  that  e\})erience  gives.  On  all  other 
fields,  from  the  be<i'innin<^  to  the  end  of  our  long:  ser- 
vice,  we  never  had  to  face  their  equals,  l^verybody 
knows  that  troops  fighting  under  the  eye  of  Stone- 
wall Jackson,  and  directed  by  Hood,  were  a  terrible 
foe.  Our  particular  opponents  were  all  good  marks- 
meii,  and  the  constant  call  of  their  officers,  "  Aim  low," 
appeared  to  us  entirely   unnecessary. 

It  was  an  awful  morning  ;  our  comrades  went  down 
one  after  another  with  a  most  disheartening  fre- 
quency, pierced  with  bullets  from  men  who  were  half 
concealed,  or  who  dodged  quickly  back  to  a  safe 
cover  the  moment  they  fired.  We  think  it  was 
enough  for  us  to  "hold  our  own"  till  Cireene's  men 
swept  in  with  their  "  terrible  and  overwhelming  at- 
tack." * 

From  all  this  story,  I  hope  the  reader  will  see  why 
the  wounding  of  Gen.  Mansfield,  which  is  the  all  im- 
portant part  in  this  narrative,  is  only  a  secondary 
matter  to  the  men  of  the  Tenth  Maine  Reiriment, 
and  why  misrei^resentations  and  errors  have  gone  un- 
disputed so  many  years.  We  never  considered  it  onr 
business  to  set  history  aright,  until  we  saw  that  our 
testimony  was  discredited  and  found  our  statement  of 


Quotation  from  Major  Robbiiis, 


I 


32  6EN.    MANSFIELD    AT    ANTIETAM. 

fact  treated  as  only  one  of  the  many  stones   of  the 
wagon-drivers  of  Sharpsburg. 


EXPLANATION  OF  THE  MAP. 


The  following  map  is  based  upon  on(^  issued  Xovemher,  1894, 
hy  tlie  "  Antietam  Board."  This  in  turn  was  based  u})on  the 
so-called  '-Micliler"  map  from  the  office  of  the  U.  S.  Engineers, 
which,  while  correct  in  the  main,  lias  many  errors  of  detail,  and 
it  is  not  likely  that  all  of  them  have  yet  been  discovered  by  the 
Board.  Indeed,  one  object  of  the  Board  in  issuing  the  map,  was 
to  invite  criticism  and  corrections  from  the  soldiers  and  others. 

The  positions  of  tlie  troo})S  cannot  be  shown  with  anything 
like  accuracy  and  clearness  on  so  small  a  map,  and  are  omitted 
excei)ting  a  few  needed  to  illustrate  the  narrative,  but  it  may 
be  said  in  a  general  way,  that  just  before  Gen.  Mansfield  was 
wounded,  the  Union  forces,  under  Hooker,  were  pushed  out  of 
"  the  great  cornfield "  and  the  East  Woods.  The  12th  Corps, 
(Mansfield's),  with  some  help  from  tlie  remnants  of  the  1st 
Corps  (Hooker's),  stopped  the  advance  of  the  Confederates  under 
Hood,  and  in  turn  drove  them  back  to  West  Woods. 

At  the  time  Mansfield  was  wounded,  Major  Robbins'  com- 
mand in  East  Woods  was  the  extreme  right  of  tlie  troops  of  the 
Confederate  left  wing  (Jackson's)  actually  engaged.  Their  line 
ran,  with  many  turns  and  several  intervals,  from  the  woods 
through  the  great  cornfield  to  the  northern  part  of  West  Woods. 
Not  many  men  in  either  army  were  firing  their  muskets  at  the 
moment  Mansfield  was  shot,  but  the  two  or  three  thousand  on 
each  side,  wlio  were  engaged,  were  very  fiercely  contending  for 
their  positions. 


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